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title was sustained. It does not necessarily follow from this de-
cision that a demand by the transferee (of the strip uninten-
tionally included in the deed description), before the lapse of
thirty years, could not be met successfully by other defenses to
prevent him from obtaining the extra strip which was not in-
tended for him in the first place.8
Tacking
Another problem involving an "extra strip" of land was dealt
with in Stutson v. McGee.0 The defendant pleaded the thirty-
year acquisitive prescription against the plaintiff's recorded
claim of title. The defendant's own possession was just a little
short (29 years and 10 months) but he proposed to supplement
this with the additional possession of his predecessor from whom
he had purchased the adjacent land. However, while there was
chronological continuity in the physical possessions, there was
no juridical link or privity between the possessors because the
strip in question was not included in the conveyance description.
Accordingly, the previous possessor was not the defendant's
author in title, and tacking of the possessions was not permit-
ted.10 With only 49 days left to complete a thirty-year prescrip-
tion, it could not be much consolation for the defendant to recog-
nize the truth of lex dura lex.
MINERAL RIGHTS
George W. Hardy, III*
Rights of Usufructuary and Naked Owner
The decision rendered in Gueno v. Medlenka' left many ques-
tions unanswered. 2 Fundamentally that decision applied Article
5523 of the Civil Code governing the rights of a usufructuary in
mines and quarries as determinative of the relative rights of a
8. Of. LA. CrvIL CODE arts. 1819, 1842 et seq., 1861, 2494-5, 2589 et seq., 2665
(1870). Also, the possibility of reformation for mutual error, Wilson v. Levy, 234
La. 719, 101 So.2d 214 (1958), and Ker v. Evershed, 41 La. Ann. 15, 6 So. 566(1889).
9. 241 La. 646, 130 So.2d 403 (1961).
10. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3493-4 (1870).
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 238 La. 1081, 117 So.2d 817 (1960).
2. For a discussion of some of the problems raised by Gueno v. Medlenka, see
34 TIu. L. REV. 784 (1960) and 20 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 773 (1960).
3. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 552 (1870): "The usufructuary has a right to the
enjoyment and proceeds of mines and quarries in the land subject to the usufruct,
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naked owner and usufructuary to oil and gas underlying land
subject to a usufruct. Concluding that the production of oil and
gas constitutes a mining operation, the Supreme Court held that
the naked owner is entitled to the oil and gas produced from
property subject to usufruct when the lease was executed and
the production effected subsequent to creation of the usufruct.
Further, the court held that the naked owner necessarily has a
right to go on the land for the purposes of exploration and pro-
duction, subject to the right of the usufructuary to indemnifi-
cation for disturbance of his use of the surface of the land.4
The recent decision rendered in King v. Buffington5 follows
the earlier case and furnishes an answer to at least one of the
questions raised by it. In the more recent case, the naked
owner and the usufructuary were both parties to the lease in
question, which had been executed subsequent to the creation of
the usufruct and signed on behalf of the naked owner by the
usufructuary, acting under power of attorney. Defendant, owner
of an undivided one-half interest in the property and usufructu-
ary as to the remainder, received and retained the bonus and
delay rentals payable under the terms of the lease. Upon refusal
by defendant to deliver to plaintiff any part of the bonus or
rental Money, plaintiff filed an action seeking a declaratory
judgment decreeing her to be entitled to a proportionate share
of the bonus and delay rental payments and to all future royal-
ties attributable to her undivided interest.
It was conceded by counsel for defendant usufructuary that
under the authority of Gueno v. Medlenka6 defendant had no
right to share in any production royalties. However, it was
urged that the court was bound to apply Articles 544,7 5458 and
if they were actually worked before the commencement of the usufruct; but he
has no right to mines and quarries not opened."
4. The court predicated the usufructary's right to indemnification upon the
provisions of id. art. 601, which prevents the owner from interfering with the
usufructary's use of the surface by alteration, demolition, repair, or erection of
works and provides that in the event of such interference, the owner shall be
bound to make good the losses and damages which may result.
5. 240 La. 955, 126 So.2d 326 (1961).
6. 238 La. 1081, 117 So.2d 817 (1960).
7. LA. CivIL CODE art. 544 (1870) : "All kinds of fruits, natural, cultivated
or civil, produced, during the existence of the usufruct, by the things subject to
it, belong to the usufructuary."
8. Id. art. 545: "Natural fruits are such as are the spontaneous product of
the earth; the product and increase of cattle are likewise natural fruits. The
fruits, which result from industry bestowed on a piece of ground, are those which
are obtained by cultivation. Civil fruits are rents of real property, the interest of
money, and annuities. All other kinds of revenue or income derived from property
by the operation of the law or private agreement, are civil fruits."
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5479 of the Civil Code entitling the usufructuary to gather civil
fruits produced as a result of the right to "lease to another"
granted to a usufructuary in Article 55510 of the Code. Attempt-
ing to distinguish the Gueno case on the ground that the earlier
controversy put at issue the validity of two separate leases, and
arguing that in the case before the court the usufructuary was
party to a lease jointly executed by her and the naked owners,
counsel urged that the authority of the Gueno decision should
not be extended to cover the particular situation facing the
court.
Rejecting defendant's arguments, the court held that the de-
cision in Gueno v. Medlenka"l was dispositive of the questions
presented and that as bonus payments are a part of the consid-
eration for the granting of a mineral lease, the exclusive author-
ity to execute which is in the naked owner, such payments, made
as compensation for the right of exploration, necessarily inure to
the benefit of the naked owner. Delay rentals, perforce, fall in
the same category. The court further declared that any state-
ments contained in Milling v. Collector of Revenue12 could have
no bearing on the questions presented by the case at bar as that
decision related solely to Article 240213 concerning property
forming part of the marital community.
A cursory examination of the Milling, Gueno, and King de-
cisions does present an apparent conflict. Milling v. Collector
of Revenue14 undoubtedly held that bonuses and royalties derived
from a mineral lease are civil fruits or rents and thus fall with-
in the community existing between husband and wife even
9. Id. art. 547: "Rents and income of property, interest of money, and
annuities, and other civil fruits, are supposed to be obtained day by day, and
they belong to the usufructuary, in proportion to the duration of his usufruct,
and are due to him, though they may not be collected at the expiration of his
usufruct."
10. Id. art. 555: "The usufructuary may enjoy by himself or lease to another,
or even sell or give away his right; but all the contracts or agreements which he
makes in this respect, whatever duration he may have intended to give them,
cease of right at the expiration of the usufruct."
11. 238 La. 1081, 117 So.2d 817 (1960).
12. 220 La. 773, 57 So.2d 679 (1952).
13. LA. CIvIL CODE art. 2402 (1870) : "This partnership or community con-
sists of the profits of all the effects of which the husband has the administration
and enjoyment, either of right or in fact, of the produce of the reciprocal industry
and libor of both husband and wife, and of the estate which they may acquire
during the marriage, either by donations made jointly to them both, or by pur-
chase, or in any other similar way, even although the purchase be only in the
name of one of the two and not of both, because in that case the period of time
when the purchase is made is alone attended to, and not the person who made
the purchase. .... "
14. 220 La. 773, 57 So.2d 679 (1952).
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though such income may flow from the husband's separate
property.
The court indicated in the recent King opinion that it felt
language appearing in Milling v. Collector of Revenue15 might be
not only inconsistent but perhaps irreconcilable with the prin-
ciples enunciated in the case under consideration. Also, the
court seemingly manifested a willingness to separate the ruling
concerning community property from that relating to mineral
leases on land subject to usufruct, thus creating a conceptual
unconformity while retaining the effects of each decision in its
own sphere of operation. However, if the usufruct cases and the
Milling decision are to remain vital, existing side by side, it
seems desirable that there be a conceptual reconciliation.
Of primary importance in reaching such a reconciliation is
the fact that in Gueno v. Medlenkal6 the court gave utterance to
a concept not previously articulated in Louisiana - the idea that
when there have been no "mines actually worked"'17 prior to
creation of the usufruct, the naked owner actually retains cer-
tain rights to use the land- the rights to explore for and to
reduce to possession and appropriate to himself the income from
production of oil and gas. Conceptually, in the framework of the
Louisiana mineral servitude, this might be taken to mean that
the mineral rights remain united with the naked owner's interest
when there has been no "actual working" of any oil or gas wells
prior to creation of the usufruct. In any case, the principle of
retention of certain rights by the naked owner in this situation
is established by the Gueno decision.
Accepting this principle, without here delving into the pro-
priety of it, it is highly reasonable to say that the usufructuary
has no interest in money paid as consideration for the lease of
rights which do not belong to him - the effective result of King
v. Buffington.'8 The mere fact that bonuses and rentals stem-
ming from such a lease do not belong to the usufructuary does
not of necessity prevent classifying them as "civil fruits." It
is consistent to hold that though they are civil fruits, they are
not among those to which the usufructuary is entitled. Such
15. Ibid.
16. 238 La. 1081, 117 So.2d 817 (1960).
17. See note 10 supra. Many of the problems raised by Gueno v. Medlenka
will turn upon an interpretation of what is meant by the phrase "if they were
actually worked before the commencement of the usufruct" as used in Article
552. Exactly what the courts will require for an oil "mine" to have been worked
prior to commencement of the usufruct remains to be seen.
18. 240 La. 955, 126 So.2d 326 (1961).
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conceptual reasoning would permit a complete adherence to the
language of Milling v. Collector of Revenue,9 when the question
of community property is involved.
This conclusion may be buttressed by provisions of the Civil
Code. Article 544 states that all kinds of fruits produced during
existence of the usufruct "by the things subject to it" belong to
the usufructuary. The court has effectively held in Gueno that
the right to use the land for exploration and production of
minerals and to appropriate the income therefrom remains in
the naked owner when there has been no development prior to
creation of the usufruct. Mineral rights are not, therefore,
"things subject to" the usufruct, and the usufructuary has no
right to any civil fruits - if bonuses, rentals, and royalties are
to be considered as such - produced by lease or exercise of these
rights.
Article 555 provides that the usufructuary may "enjoy by
himself or lease to another, or even sell or give away his right."
(Emphasis added.) This, too, lends substance to the view that
the usufructuary's right to enjoy civil fruits derived from the
property should be limited to those fruits emanating from a
lease, sale, or other use or disposition of the rights which are
his and should not include fruits resulting from transactions in-
volving rights which did not pass to him upon creation of the
usufruct.
The writer feels that the logic of the King opinion flows
inevitably from the result reached in Gueno v. Medlenka.20 Fur-
thermore, these decisions can and, perhaps in the interest of
consistency, should be reconciled with Milling v. Collector of
Revenue. One means of so doing would be to adopt the course
of conceptual reasoning outlined above.
Rights of Mineral Lessee - Nature of Mineral Lease
Harwood Oil & Mining Co. v. Black2' reflects the court's
steadfast adherence to the position that a mineral lease is a
"contract of letting and hiring within the meaning of the codal
articles, and that the lessee in such a mineral lease obtains an
obligatory or personal right only and not a servitude on the
realty or a real right in the land." Plaintiff, mineral lessee
19. 220 La. 773, 57 So.2d 679 (1952).
20. 238 La. 1081, 117 So.2d 817 (1960).
21. 240 La. 641, 57 So.2d 679 (1960).
22. Arnold v. Sun Oil Co., 218 La. 50, 48 So.2d 369, 145 (1950), as cited by
the court in Hardwood Oil and Mining Co. v. Black, supra note 21.
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of the bed of Castor Bayou, held a surface lease to adjacent
property by which it was permitted to locate equipment for
directional drilling operations beneath the stream bed. Defend-
ant, holder of a mineral lease on the same adjacent property
on which plaintiff had surface rights, had constructed on the
property roads which passed through it to and along the bank
of the bayou. Defendant refused plaintiff access to its roads.
Among other issues, the court was required to dispose of
plaintiff's claim, upheld by the two lower tribunals, that it was
owner of an estate such as would entitle it to a right of access
under Article 699 of the Civil Code, granting to the owner of an
enclosed estate a right of passage to a public road over his
neighbor's estate, subject to the neighbor's right to indemnity
for any damage occasioned.
Pointing to the decisionsn rendered interpreting what is
now R.S. 9:1105, both before and after amendment in 1950,24
and quoting at some length from Reagan v. Murphy,25 a recent
pronouncement in this regard, the court reversed the decision
of the lower courts. It declared that the right of passage estab-
lished by Article 699 is a predial servitude which cannot be
claimed by the mineral lessee of one estate as against the mineral
lessee of an adjacent estate.2
This opinion falls readily into the pattern established by
earlier cases.27 Since the initial interpretations of Act 205 of
1938 (R.S. 9:1105) ,28 the court has refused to grant character-
23. Arnold v. Sun Oil Co., 218 La. 50, 48 So.2d 369 (1950); Reagan v.
Murphy, 235 La. 529, 105 So.2d 210 (1958).
24. One result of Arnold v. Sun Oil Company, supra note 23, was an amend-
ment to Act 205 of 1938, now LA. R.S. 9:1105 (1950), by the addition of the
following sentence: "This section shall be considered as substantive as well as
procedural so that the owners of oil, gas and other mineral leases and contracts
within the purpose of this section shall have the benefit of all laws relating to
the owners of real rights in immovable property or real estate."
25. 235 La. 529, 105 So.2d 210 (1958).
26. Assuming that the estate involved in the case under discussion was
actually enclosed, its owner could, apparently, have claimed a right of passage
against the owner of the adjacent property. There was no attempt to establish
the right of the plaintiff to utilize its lessor's right of passage. Such a claim
might have raised additional interesting problems concerning the interpretation of
LA. R.S. 9:1105 (1950).
27. Tinsley v. Seismic Explorations, Inc., 239 La. 23, 117 So.2d 897 (1960)
Reagan v. Murphy, 235 La. 529, 105 So.2d 210 (1958) ; Arnold v. Sun Oil Co.,
218 La. 50, 48 So.2d 369 (1950); Wier v. Grubb, 215 La. 967, 41 So.2d 846
(1949) ; Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Reese, 195 La. 359, 196 So. 558 (1940) ;
Tyson v. Surf Oil Co., 195 La. 248, 196 So. 336 (1940) ; Gulf Refining Co. v.
Glassell, 186 La. 190, 171 So. 846 (1936).
28. See cases cited in note 27 supra.
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istics of a real right to the mineral lease,29 except for the recog-
nition of the procedural rights of the lessee.80 Specific legis-
lative enactments have been necessary to give the mineral lessee
substantive rights sufficient to protect his interest in the event
of judicial partition, 1 either in kind or by licitation, and to en-
title him to rely upon the public records.8 2
Without entering into a discussion of the merits of the con-
troversy as to whether the course which the jurisprudence has
taken is the best one, it is sufficient to recognize that the Har-
wood decision is consistent with its forerunners. Further, it may
be noted that the present classification of a mineral lease does
have possible effects which do not seem desirable, as, for ex-
ample, its impact on the distribution of a decedent's estate when
he is a non-domiciliary with Louisiana lease holdings. Accept-
ance of the fact that the jurisprudence has developed in this
manner leads to the suggestion that, if it is advisable to grant to
the mineral lease individual characteristics of a real right, there
should perhaps be some concerted and intensive effort to discern
these individual characteristics and incorporate them into the
statutory law. On the other hand, if the proper definition of the
rights accorded by mineral leases should be as real rights,
appropriate and effective action should be taken. In any case, it
seems desirable that some means be seized upon to end the con-
tinuing difficulties raised by failure to secure definitive legis-
lation.
Effect of Conservation Order on Voluntary Unit
The factual situation presented by Humble Oil & Refining
Co. v. Jones"8 sets the scene for another of the skirmishes in the
long conflict between contractual rights and conservation orders.
In 1955 Humble, acting under authority granted in a group of
mineral leases, established by recorded declaration a voluntary
unit comprising 160 acres. Production was obtained on the unit
29. See cases cited in note 27 supra.
30. See cases cited in note 27 supra.
31. Following the decision rendered in Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Reese,
195 La. 359, 196 So. 558 (1940), Article 741 of the Civil Code was amended for
the specific purpose of granting to a mineral lessee, as well as those with other
types of mineral interests, protection in the event of judicial partition either by
licitation or in kind.
32. The holding of Arnold v. Sun Oil Co., 218 La. 50, 48 So.2d 369 (1950),
was legislatively overruled by passage of LA. R.S. 9:2721-24 (1950), subjecting
oil, gas and mineral leases as well as all other instruments of "writing relating to
or affecting immovable property," to the registry laws.
33. 241 La. 661, 130 So.2d 408 (1961).
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shortly thereafter, and royalties were paid on the basis of this
contractually established unit until 1958. In that year the De-
partment of Conservation, after hoarings on application of
Humble, issued an order creating a forced production unit com-
prising 177.60 acres. The same well which had been the source
of production for the voluntary unit was designated as the unit
well in the forced order of the commissioner. The order also
directed that the tracts included should share in production in
the proportion that the surface acreage of each bore to the
entire acreage within the unit.
The forced and voluntary units were not coextensive, the
former overlapping the latter as to only 101.13 acres. Approxi-
mately 58 acres in the voluntary unit lay outside the forced unit,
and the forced unit included approximately 76 acres of land not
encompassed by the voluntary unit. As a result of the conserva-
tion order, the unit operator was required to pay royalties in the
proportion directed without regard to obligations incurred by it
under the contractual or voluntary unit.
The court did not find it necessary to render a decision on
the merits in this instance.84 However, the questions raised as
to the effect of the conservation order on the contractually estab-
lished unit are significant. The court of appeal solved the prob-
lem by declaring that the conservation order superseded the
voluntarily established unit.8 5
The problems raised by this type of situation are numerous.
It will be interesting to observe the manner of their resolution.
PARTICULAR CONTRACTS
J. Denson Smith*
In the case of Prevot v. Courtney' it was held that the pur-
34. The original action was a suit by the lessee-unit operator against one lessor
who had refused tendered royalties after establishment of the conservation unit.
The court decided that the rights of parties to the voluntary unit, especially those
of owners of the property not included in the forced unit, would be under direct
consideration in any decision on the merits. If the decision of the court of appeal
were followed, those persons owning mineral and royalty interests on the land
within the contractual unit but not within the forced unit would no longer be
entitled to share in royalties according to the court. Therefore, it was concluded
that those mineral and royalty owners interested in the contractual unit in addi-
tion to the defendant-lessor were indispensable parties to the action, and the suit
was remanded to allow plaintiff-lessee to implead any indispensable parties.
35. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Jones, 135 So.2d 640 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1960).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 241 La. 313, 129 So.2d 1 (1961).
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